the case cannot be a final authority for the question of the legality of consensual SM, since one of the parties to the encounter died in the process, therefore precluding a rigorous assessment of whether consent truly existed. Indeed there was some ambiguity as whether the accused's wife was trying to communicate that she was suffering pain and distress rather than experiencing pain and pleasure.
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What is more, the case can be read as not one of SM at all: the sex which caused the injury leading to death involved anal penetration with an object (a whip), but this act does not in itself mark the encounter as one of SM. Support for this assertion can be gained from the somewhat analogous English case of R v Slingsby, 12 in which a man anally and vaginally penetrated a woman with his fist whilst wearing a signet ring. The woman died of septicaemia after her injuries became infected, and it was held that the accused was not guilty of manslaughter since this was merely vigorous sexual activity to which his partner had consented. Similarly, the Crown in
McDonald conceded that if the appellant had intended only to cause pain, as opposed to actual injury, this in itself would not constitute evil intent and the conviction could not be maintained. 13 In any case, even if McDonald were held to be relevant to SM, the degree of violence inflicted in the case is not representative of the range of sado-8 1975 JC 30. 9 At 33. 10 2004 SCCR 161. 11 Arguably, even if the rule on consent established in Smart were not followed, and SM sex was something that could be consented to, the jury might still have convicted McDonald of culpable homicide (i.e. finding that the encounter was non-consensual). 12 [1995] Crim LR 570. 13 In my view there is an unexplored relationship here between pain and harm, and one can question whether all pain is necessarily harmful.
could still look to law to protect those who do not in fact consent to SM sexual behaviour (in the same way that we rely on the law to protect us from non-consensual non-SM sexual acts). Arguably then, since the facts of a case like Brown have not been considered in Scotland, if a case about SM arose here there might still be room
for Scottish courts to find in the future that SM is a valid form of sexual expression and more akin to touching rather to fighting. Can Scotland for once step into the breach and boldly go beyond the morality driven conservatism of the court in Brown?
In short, are the Scottish courts likely to find that consensual SM contact is sexual activity rather than violence?
B. SEXUAL NORM(ATIVE)S
A close reading of Sir Gerald Gordon's authoritative commentary on Scots criminal law yields little on the subject of sadomasochism (though Gordon does comment on consent in assaults elsewhere). 15 However, as Gordon notes in the second edition in 1978, the court in Smart rejected the distinction that he himself made in the first edition in 1967 between minor and major injuries. In the first edition, Gordon stated that " [w] here the assault does not involve another crime, the position appears to be that consent is a good defence provided that not more than a certain degree of injury is caused". 16 The court in Smart however said that leaving aside the difficulty of distinguishing between minor and major injury, that what was relevant was not the level of injury but whether or not the accused displayed "evil intent". 17 It appears, then, that were Brown-like circumstances to come before them, the Scottish criminal courts would reach a similar conclusion to that reached in Brown and convict participants in such acts; indeed, one might speculate that the Scottish courts would be even more conservative in SM cases than their English counterparts, given that unlike Brown, the court in Smart refused to recognise a distinction between minor and major 14 A Beckmann, "Deconstructing myths: the social construction of 'sadomasochism' versus 'subjugated knowledges' of practitioners of consensual SM" (2001) English law injuries that might be inflicted through "normal" sexual interaction, that cause manifest damage to skin -bruises, bites, etc -would be seen as a common assault, and criminalised (unless consented to). These are, in essence, injuries, but not assaults. As in the Scottish context, given the position taken in Smart, it seems that the primary concern regarding assault in both jurisdictions, then, is the question of the motivation or intention underlying the contact. Thus, if the primary intention of the touching is to hurt or harm the touchee, then it is an injury, an assault that cannot be consented to; however, if this touching takes place in the course of a "normal" sexual encounter where the primary intention is pleasure (whether mutual or not) then it does not amount to injury but to normal sexual touching. In other words it is still the intention, the mens rea of the person doing the touching that is the lynchpin of the offence of assault, rather than the consent itself.
Thus we can say that consent does no work in delineating lawful from unlawful contact in these kinds of cases. Rather, it is the "good" (rather than "evil') intention of the person doing the touching that is necessary (and also sufficient) 21 to
19 Egan (n 6). 20 M S Weinberg, C J Williams and C Moser, "The social constituents of sadomasochism" (1983) 31 Social Problems 379. 21 Sufficient in the sense that currently, under Scots criminal law, any man who touches a woman in a sexual context can expect the law to affirm the legality of that contact, regardless of a lack of consent on her part, if he genuinely believed her to be consenting. The Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 , not yet in force, does not replace this subjective test with a fully objective one, but requires that a man has reasonable belief in consent, based on some (unspecified) steps he took to confirm his belief (section 1(2)). Feminists and other critical scholars have been very sceptical of the practical value of a similar reform introduced in England and Wales, particularly when the accused is not compelled to testify and there can be no negative inference render the touching lawful. But the question remains as to what counts as "good"
intentions. In practice, assessing good intentions involves a normative assessment of the kind of sexual contact that has taken place. In a "normal" sexual interaction, while there may well be some low-level bodily harm, it is the nature of the sexual interaction, rather than the consent of the touchee, that makes the contact lawful. The presumption that those relationships perceived as normal are (usually) less likely to cause anything other than low level damage (if any at all), and that those interactions which cause high levels of injury are perceived to be abnormal and perverted, relies upon a rather narrow view (based on consensual heterosexual, vaginally-penetrative sex in the missionary position) of what constitutes a normal sexual encounter.
Certainly it is true to say that the more one strays from this narrow ("vanilla") form of sexual interaction, and travels along the spectrum of human sexual behaviour, the more likely we are to leave our mark on the bodies of the people we interact with sexually.
Also relevant here is the question of what has been used to bring the "injurious" pleasure -if the instruments of pleasure are the hands, the fingers and the penis, then again the risk of "injury" or damage inflicted is both normalised, and minimised -a nipple that is grazed from being pinched or bitten may well be seen as unproblematic as compared with a nipple that is bruised or bleeding from having been compressed in a nipple clamp. Likewise, it seems that internal vaginal bleeding after vigorous and prolonged penile penetrative intercourse (or even, as in Slingsby, fisting) may well be seen as more normal than lesser injuries inflicted with needles, hot wax, hot irons or nails. Therefore there appears to be some underlying and unstated normative principle driving the differentiation of normal (permissible) from abnormal (impermissible) sexual behaviours; some consensual encounters where activities result in injury (and in some cases even death) are permissible, others are not. The majority decision in Brown criminalised consensual assault amounting to actual bodily harm (or above), even where the assault is sexual in nature. This is predicated on the following assumptions: that sex and violence are distinct and easily separable (which is not obvious); that the court is in the best position to tell the difference (which is certainly not obvious); and that consent to one is not necessarily consent to the other (which, insofar as they can be separated, is arguably true). The court does not deny the "enthusiasm" of the defendants in choosing to participate in certain sexual behaviours, but instead reads the acts as seriously violent, and thereby incapable of being "ratified" by the concept of consent. 23 In Brown, some judges were prepared to go further than just ignore consent as the relevant factor -the consent of such persons was perceived by Lord Templeman to be "dubious and worthless". 24 Here, the court's view of sex is obscured by a focus on violence, in the sense that the supposedly perverted and deviant form of sex engaged in here takes the behaviour out of the normal category of touching and into the abnormal category of injury and violence.
C. SEX OR VIOLENCE? DRAWING LINES
Further, the rule in Brown that one cannot consent to assaults that cause actual bodily harm (other than in well established exceptional situations) has now been 22 Egan (n 6). 23 N Athanassoulis also suggests that the offences have been misclassified as violence, but she tries to demonstrate this through comparing SM (which she says is sex expressed through violence) with rape (which she claims is violence expressed through sex Those who argue against the criminalisation of SM sex contend that consent should be allowed to do more of the work in drawing the line between lawful and unlawful behaviour. Here it is necessary to set aside the debate over the merits and demerits of allowing a person to consent to enslavement or to being killed. Most of those against the criminalisation of SM agree that the criminal law is warranted in setting some limits to the kinds of behaviour that we can consent to (say, the criminalisation of grievous bodily harm), and that consensual slavery, for example, is one area where the law can justifiably intervene paternalistically. One critique of Brown is that the criminal law prevents the participants from acting in their own best interests as it prohibits them from expressing their sexual autonomy, 32 and it is much less clear (assisted suicide notwithstanding) that consenting to being killed or consenting to enslavement is in the same "best interests" ball-park. The argument remains then, that when pronouncing certain acts unlawful, the criminal law is making prejudicial normative assessments about the sexual behaviour engaged in, and that, instead, we ought to let consent underpin the legality of the sex we have.
This is not to say that consent is itself unproblematic (and indeed in the context of sexual offences, consent has been identified as particularly troubling) 33 but simply that a contextualised analysis of the opportunity that participants have to freely agree to sexual activity is a more morally ound basis for the criminalisation of (sexual) assaults than a (hetero)normative assessment of "normal" as opposed to "abnormal" (perverted) sexual behaviour or relationships, and "normal" as opposed to "abnormal" levels of injury (and these two levels of inquiry are of course intertwined).
Many of those who argue specifically against the criminalisation of SM activities do so from a liberal perspective -the protection of autonomy, self- 34 See e.g. Athanassoulis (n 23); Bibbings and Alldridge (n 6).
and non-consensual sado-masochism could be prosecuted in the same way as nonconsensual sexual intercourse (but presenting, of course, many of the same practical problems of reporting, proof and evidence). There remains a critical tension, however, around key liberal concepts such as autonomy and privacy. In particular, feminists and gay and lesbian scholars (amongst others) have criticised the application of both autonomy and the classic public/private divide to the area of sexual relationships.
Nicola Lacey, for example, prefers to talk about the protection of sexual integrity rather than autonomy. Sexual integrity, she argues, better demonstrates that part of the harm of sexual offences centres on the victim's inability to integrate psychic and bodily experiences. 35 Lacey understands autonomy as too closely related to its history of the abstract choosing subject and, referring to Cornell, argues that the project of personhood requires a more active, positive and embodied view of the sexual self than autonomy has traditionally allowed.
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This kind of approach, applied to SM, would allow for consensual sadomasochistic practices, where participants can integrate psychic and bodily experiences, but without having to rely upon individualised, decontextualised, "private" readings of autonomy. Carl Stychin, a queer legal theorist, has argued that not only are homosexual subjects entitled to privacy protections, but that all sexual subjects have a right to claim a public sexual identity, and to take part in public life as Risks of all sorts are inherent in sexual contact. We are at risk of disease, of injury, of fraud and misrepresentation, of assault and rape, and some of us are at risk of becoming pregnant. But we do not outlaw "normal" or non-SM consensual sexual encounters on the basis that they are all, to some extent, risky, and that some will end in a negative outcome. Allowing consenting adults to engage in sex that carries a risk of HIV is testament to this. In other words, we value (historically, reproductive, hetero) sex to the degree that we are willing to accept some level of risk, and some level of abuse and violence, and ultimately are unwilling to outlaw sexual intercourse on the basis of these risks and negative outcomes. Clearly the same is not true of SM.
SM sexual contact is not valued as a valid form of sexual expression and therefore the courts have focussed on the risks, the potentially negative outcomes and use these as a basis for outlawing SM.
This focus on risk and the labelling of SM as the most risky form in the spectrum of sexual behaviour is in contradistinction to the perceptions of those who take part in SM sexual activities. Participants in Beckmann's study 43 saw their behaviour as less risky than "regular" sex -as a response to HIV and AIDS, and a way to avoid risks of "normal" penetrative intercourse -both by heterosexual and gay male subjects who have tried to avoid the normative constraints of penetrative sex.
Freedom or release through SM is also described by some participants -freedom from constraining expectations of what is normal sex. As Halley says, freedom might be not be a release from repression as such but "a practice of active engagement in power". 44 Beckmann's participants reported a feeling of safety -not only in terms of safe sex but in terms of community, and an environment of trust, 45 but also a feeling of spiritual release: injuries do not hurt, rather it is similar to being caressed. 46 Similarly, the focus in SM often moves away from penetrative or even genital acts and encompasses a range of other acts that decentre "normal" genital contact and emphasise the sensuality and erogeneity of the whole body. Since there is no what
Beckmann calls "direct path" between the act and the pleasure, and because the contact is not genital, it encourages broader and more explicit communication between parties as to pleasure, and displaces the expectation that (penile) penetration is the epitome of sexual pleasure. 47 This was also referred to by one of the gay men
Beckmann interviewed who saw his (non-penetrative) SM practice as an alternative to what he saw as the penetrative sexuality in gay culture.
One cannot therefore read the criminalisation of SM in the following way: it is quintessentially "normal" (and therefore not harmful) to have penile penetrative sex (and perhaps this is even true now for gay men), and perhaps also digital penetration.
Therefore, injuries caused in this way do not count as assaults. Other forms of penetration, however, or other non-genital forms of sexual contact (for example using instruments) that cause similar levels of injury, are inherently too "risky" (though one might suspect that it is really "normal society" that is perceived to be at risk) and therefore do not fall within the protected scope of behaviours and therefore are assaults.
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F. CONCLUSION: OPTIMISM OVER EXPERIENCE?
Criminalisation of SM is disproportionate, unnecessary and in many ways unenforceable. Where it is enforced, the pain of pleasure is the cost and pain of punishment. This chapter has offered a re-reading of the law on SM in both Scotland (hetero)sexual citizens as opposed to risky, perverted and dangerous sexual deviants (SMers).
A traditional radical feminist reading might see SM as more structurally problematic, as representing all that is wrong with dominance and subordination in gender relations. 49 However a more "sex radical" feminism would re-read SM as an opportunity for women to step outside traditional gendered socio-sexual scripts of passivity and victimhood, and away from subordination laden protectionism. 50 Yet another alternative perspective which leans more towards queer and post modern feminism, which I have tried to present here, focuses on the ways in which the law both produces and regulates certain kinds of sexual subjects, and raises the possibility that we might reimagine law in a less gendered and heteronormative way in order, as Janet Halley would say, to get "a better outcome for the pervert". 51 Historically, sexual stimulation has not always been negatively perceived and the notion of sadomasochism is historically contingent and socially constructed. 52 The Scottish criminal
courts have yet to meet a case of SM head on. Let us hope, then, that despite the often heteronormatively conservative role of the courts, when faced directly with the question of the lawfulness of SM, the courts here will present us with a better outcome for the pervert.
